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Introduction
Across various domains—such as health, ed-
ucation, and housing—improving societal wel-
fare involves allocating resources, setting poli-
cies, targeting interventions, and regulating
activities. These solutions have an immense
impact on the day-to-day lives of individuals,
whether in the form of access to quality health-
care, labor market outcomes, or how votes are
accounted for in a democratic society. Prob-
lems that can have an outsized impact on
individuals whose opportunities have histori-
cally been limited often pose conceptual and
technical challenges, requiring insights from
many disciplines. Conversely, the lack of inter-
disciplinary approach can leave these urgent
needs unaddressed and can even exacerbate
underlying socioeconomic inequalities.
To realize the opportunities in these domains,
we need to correctly set objectives and reason
about human behavior and actions. Doing so
requires a deep grounding in the field of in-
terest and collaboration with domain experts
who understand the societal implications and
feasibility of proposed solutions. These in-
sights can play an instrumental role in propos-
ing algorithmically-informed policies. In many
cases, the input data for our algorithms may
be generated by strategic and self-interested
individuals who have a stake in the outcome
of the algorithm. To get around this issue, we
can deploy techniques from mechanism de-
sign, which uses game theory to align incen-
tives or analyze the strategic behavior of indi-
viduals who interact with the algorithms.
The Mechanism Design for Social Good
(MD4SG) research agenda is to address prob-
lems for which insights from algorithms, op-
timization, and mechanism design have the
potential to improve access to opportunity.
These include allocating affordable housing
services, designing efficient health insurance
markets, setting subsidies to alleviate eco-
nomic inequality, and several other issues af-
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fecting many individuals’ livelihoods. This
research area falls at the interface of artifi-
cial intelligence, theoretical computer science,
and the social sciences. Since the fall of
2016, the authors of this piece have been co-
organizing the Mechanism Design for Social
Good research group, workshop series, and
colloquium series Abebe and Goldner [2016,
2018]. The group comprises a large net-
work of researchers from various disciplines,
including computer science, economics, soci-
ology, operations research, and public policy.
Members of the group partner with domain ex-
perts in non-government organizations, think
tanks, companies, and other entities with a
shared mission. The mission is to explore new
frontiers, garner interest in directions in which
algorithmic and mechanism design insights
have been under-utilized but have the po-
tential to inform innovative interventions, and
highlight exemplary work.
In this piece, we discuss three exciting re-
search avenues within MD4SG. For each of
these, we showcase ongoing work, underline
new directions, and discuss potential for im-
plementing existing work in practice.
Access to Opportunity in the
Developing World
New technologies and data sources are fre-
quently leveraged to understand, evaluate,
and address societal concerns across the
world. In many developing nations, however,
there is a lack of information regarding un-
derlying matters—whether that be the preva-
lence of diseases or accurate measurements
of economic welfare and poverty—due to the
unavailability of high-quality, comprehensive,
and reliable data UN [2014]. This limits the im-
plementation of effective policies and interven-
tions. An emerging solution, which has been
successfully demonstrated by the Information
Communication Technology for Development
(ICT4D) research community, has been to
take advantage of high phone and Internet
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penetration rates across developing nations to
design new technologies which enable collec-
tion and sharing of high-quality data. There
has also been recent work from within the AI
community to use new data sources to close
this information gap Abebe et al. [2018], Jean
et al. [2016]. Such AI-driven approaches sur-
face new algorithmic, modeling, and mecha-
nism design questions to improve the lives of
many under-served individuals.
A prominent example is in agriculture, which
accounts for a large portion of the econ-
omy in many developing nations. Here, vi-
ral disease attacks on crops is a leading
cause of food insecurity and poverty. Tradi-
tional disease surveillance methods fail to pro-
vide adequate information to curtail the im-
pact of diseases Mwebaze and Biehl [2016],
Mwebaze and Owomugisha [2016], Quinn
et al. [2011]. The Cassava Adhoc Surveil-
lance Project from Makerere University imple-
ments crowd-sourcing surveillance using pic-
tures taken by mobile phones in order to ad-
dress this gap Mutembesa et al. [2018]. The
tool is set up as a game between farmers and
other collaborators, and aims to collect truth-
ful, high-value data (e.g., data from hard-to-
reach locations). This approach underlines
interesting challenges, such as how to opti-
mally incentivize individuals to collect high-
quality information and how to augment this
information with existing methods. Similar
issues arise in other domains—e.g., in citi-
zen science and in computational sustainabil-
ity Xue et al. [2016a,b]. Finding solutions in
the context of the developing world may there-
fore have a broader global impact.
Lack of information also leads to inefficien-
cies in existing systems, presenting a possi-
bility to introduce solutions that abide by exist-
ing cultural and technological constraints. For
instance, large price discrepancies and major
arbitrage opportunities present in markets for
agricultural products in Uganda suggest large
market inefficiencies Ssekibuule et al. [2013].
To alleviate this, Newman et al. [2018] intro-
duce Kudu—a mobile technology that func-
tions over feature phones via SMS service.
Kudu facilitates transactions between farmers
in rural areas and buyers at markets in cities
by allowing sellers and buyers to post their
asks and offers. Kudu has been adapted by
users across Uganda and many trades have
been realized through this system.
Availability of new technologies also presents
opportunities to tackle fundamental problems
related to poverty. Advances in last-mile pay-
ment technologies, for example, enable large-
scale, secure cash transfers. GiveDirectly
leverages this and the popularity of mobile
money across the world to create a system
where donors can directly transfer cash to re-
cipients GD, Blattman and Niehaus [2014].
GiveDirectly moves the decision about how to
use aid from policy-makers to recipients, giv-
ing recipients maximum flexibility. Such aid
generates heterogeneity in outcomes—e.g.,
families may use aid to start a business, pay
rent, cover health costs, and so on. Policy-
makers used to prioritizing specific outcomes
may be uncomfortable by such a model. A re-
search question then is: can we predict how a
given population will use aid? Likewise, how
can we target people for whom the interven-
tions will make the largest difference? Aid has
historically been targeted on the basis of find-
ing the most deprived people. The ability to
model heterogeneous treatment effects opens
the door for designing more nuanced mecha-
nisms that fairly and efficiently allocate subsi-
dies in order to maximize a desired outcome.
Problems in the developing world surface
unique challenges at the intersection of AI,
ICT4D, and development economics. So-
lutions often have to be implemented in
resource-constrained environments (e.g., over
feature phones or with low network connectiv-
ity) Brunette et al. [2013], Patel et al. [2010].
Key populations of interest (e.g., women, peo-
ple living in rural parts, individuals with dis-
abilities) may not be easily accessible Sultana
et al. [2018], Vashistha et al. [2015b,a]. In-
dividuals may have low-literacy Sambasivan
et al. [2010]. Lack of understanding of socio-
cultural norms and politics, furthermore, may
inhibit proposed interventions Vashistha et al.
[2018]. All of these highlight the need for
a multi-stakeholder approach that leverages
technological advances, innovative technical
solutions, and partnerships with individuals
and organizations that will be impacted by the
solutions. MD4SG fosters one such environ-
ment in which insights from across these dis-
ciplines inform the design of algorithms and
mechanisms to improve the lives of individu-
als across the world.
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Labor, Platforms, and Discrimination
Online platforms are ubiquitous, providing a
vast playground for algorithm design and arti-
ficial intelligence. Every policy decision, how-
ever, impacts and interacts with the platform’s
strategic users. In this section, we will focus
on online labor markets and how discrimina-
tion effects stem from a platform’s decisions.
Past work begins to investigate some aspects
of platforms, of strategic agents, and of dis-
crimination in labor markets, but there are still
major opportunities for work at the intersec-
tion, and insights from mechanism design and
AI are ripe for the job.
One central issue surrounding labor markets
is that of hiring, in which a firm takes infor-
mation about a potential candidate and makes
an employment decision. Firms act as classi-
fiers, labeling each applicant as “hire” or “not
hire” based on an applicant’s “features,” such
as educational investment or a worker’s pro-
ductivity reputation. In the process of making
hiring decisions, however, the firm may poten-
tially make discriminatory decisions—perhaps
by using protected attributes, or by not cor-
recting for differences in applications that stem
from systemic discrimination Bertrand and
Mullainathan [2004], Marlowe et al. [1996].
Bias in hiring decisions may arise due to im-
plicit human bias or algorithmic bias, in which
algorithms replicate human and/or historic dis-
crimination that is reflected in the data on
which they are trained Broussard [2018], Eu-
banks [2018], Noble [2018], O’Neil [2016].
One recent line of work investigates hiring
policies that achieve diversity or statistical par-
ity (with respect to certain groups) among the
hired workers, and how workers make their
investment decisions (e.g. whether to at-
tend college) based on the hiring policies in
place. Coate and Loury [1993], Fryer Jr and
Loury [2013], Hu and Chen [2017] study set-
tings where there is some known underlying
bias or historical discrimination against certain
groups; the aim is to characterize hiring poli-
cies that are optimal-subject-to-fair-hiring, and
to quantify any loss in efficiency compared
to optimal-but-discriminatory policies. These
works explore two settings: first, when hiring
decisions must be “group-blind,” that is, they
cannot take group membership into account,
and second, when they are “group-aware”.
The aim is to choose hiring policies that will
mitigate discrimination against protected cat-
egories. Hu and Chen [2017] highlights ad-
ditional complexity that arises in dynamic set-
tings where workers are hired based on invest-
ment decisions (e.g. college GPA) in an ini-
tial temporary labor market (e.g. internships)
and this job creates a worker’s initial produc-
tivity reputation that is then used in the per-
manent labor market. Many of these findings
also discuss “trade-offs” between group-blind
and group-aware policies.
Another aspect of labor markets is that a
worker may have the ability to pay to change a
feature of her application in some illegitimate
or unfair way in order to improve her outcome
in the labor market. Hardt et al. [2016] exam-
ine this problem from a robust machine learn-
ing perspective. Under certain assumptions of
the cost required to change an applicant’s rep-
utation, they characterize classifiers that opti-
mally compare to the original reputation (be-
fore the applicant modified it).
These are only two aspects at the interplay
between hiring and strategic agents; hiring,
furthermore, is only one aspect of the labor
market. Consider today’s popular online la-
bor markets, such as Mechanical Turk, Up-
work, Task Rabbit, and Lyft, in which the plat-
form’s goal is to match workers to employers
or jobs. In these labor markets, the platform’s
decisions, even at a granular level, have a
large impact on the workers and firms. Con-
sider the following platform decisions. Visi-
bility: How many firms can workers see at a
time? What capacity do they have to search
job offers? Can workers see jobs and jobs see
workers? Initiation: Which side (or both) can
submit applications? Initiate messaging? Set
contract terms? Information: What informa-
tion is displayed about parties on the opposite
side? Name? Photo? Ethnicity? Wage his-
tory? Reputation?
Each of these decisions impacts the
outcome—not only the quality of the match,
but also whether (and how much) discrim-
ination occurs. In a recent paper, Levy
and Barocas [2017] outline categories of
platform decisions which may mitigate or
perpetuate discrimination in labor markets,
including the high-level categories of setting
platform discrimination policies or norms,
3
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structuring information and interactions, and
monitoring/evaluating discriminatory conduct.
In offline labor markets, it may be challeng-
ing or infeasible to collect data to understand
the nature and extent of discrimination. On-
line labor markets, on the other hand, yield
rich data about employer-employee interac-
tions and present the possibility of conduct-
ing experiments aimed at reducing bias and
discrimination or other desired societal objec-
tives. For instance, Barach and Horton [2017]
look at the impact on hiring of hiding workers’
wage history. Horton and Johari [2015], Hor-
ton [2018] look at the impact of trying to elicit
additional information (features) from workers
or firms, and the impact of this strategically-
reported information on hiring. Horton [2017]
examines who the hired worker population is
when a minimum wage is imposed on one
platform. Each of these provide insights into
labor dynamics that may inform platform de-
sign and interventions.
Online labor markets provide a rich play-
ground for techniques from algorithms, AI, and
mechanism design to study how each aspect
of platform design impacts discriminatory ef-
fects, workers’ actions, and the desired objec-
tive for the platform.
Allocating Housing and Homelessness
Resources
Allocation of resources—such as public hous-
ing, housing vouchers, and homelessness
services—has a long history in the economics
and computation literature. Even simple-to-
state problems here have given rise to chal-
lenging research questions, many of which
are still open. Increased scarcity of hous-
ing resources, growing need for services, and
the use of algorithmic decision-making tools
all open up several avenues with major op-
portunities for reforming policies and regula-
tions. Here, we discuss some foundational
work, new challenges, and opportunities that
emerge at the nexus of algorithm and mecha-
nism design, AI, and the social sciences.
Millions of individuals across the US have
been evicted or are at risk of experiencing
eviction every year. In groundbreaking work,
Desmond [2012, 2016] shows that eviction is
much more common than was previously doc-
umented. By compiling the first ever evictions
database, Desmond shows that there is an es-
timate of 2.3 million evictions in 2016 alone
and argues that eviction is a cause of poverty
EL [2018]. Using this database, and other
similar datasets, we may be able to employ a
combination of machine learning and statisti-
cal techniques to gain a better understanding
of what causes housing instability and home-
lessness. We may then be able to build on
this work to design algorithms and mecha-
nisms that can improve on allocation policies.
For instance, Kube et al. [2018] uses counter-
factual predictions to improve homelessness
service provisions. By doing so, they realize
some gains on reducing the number of fami-
lies experiencing repeated episodes of home-
lessness. At the same time, Eubanks [2018]
emphasizes that caution must be taken when
using automated decision-making tools for al-
locating limited resources in such high-stakes
scenarios. Eubanks argues that such tools
may be used to reduce failure rates by case-
workers; but, if not approached with care, they
can deepen already existing inequalities. Fur-
thermore, such tools alone are limited: they
do not address the lack of housing and home-
lessness resources or eliminate human biases
or discrimination. It is therefore crucial to take
advantage of the confluence of insights from
cross many disciplines in order to serve the
needs of such vulnerable populations.
An issue that is growing in prominence in
housing contexts is that of information. Little
is documented about how landlords or hous-
ing authorities screen applications and make
decisions. Ambrose and Diop [2016] show
that there is increased restriction in access to
rental housing since landlords mitigate infor-
mation asymmetry by investing in screening
tenants. With the increased use and availabil-
ity of data about individuals, it is of paramount
importance to understand the role of informa-
tion in the decision-making process of entities,
such as landlords or housing agencies, who
have enormous discretion in how and whether
families are housed.
Although the introduction of automated tools
introduces acute challenges related to hous-
ing, the use of algorithmic techniques dates
back several decades and there are many fun-
damental problems that remain unsolved. An
early work here is that of Hylland and Zeck-
4
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hauser [1979], which considers the “house al-
location problem” of assigning each individ-
ual to one item, such as a house. They in-
troduce a mechanism which satisfies natu-
ral efficiency and fairness notions but is not
incentive-compatible. That is, individuals may
be able to improve their outcome by misreport-
ing their true preferences. Since then, several
mechanisms have been proposed, including
the popular Randomized Serial Dictatorship
(RSD) mechanism, which uses a random lot-
tery Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1998]. This
mechanism is incentive-compatible, but fails
to satisfy the fairness criteria of Hylland and
Zeckhauser [1979]. It is used as a standard
mechanism in many domains, including hous-
ing. An outstanding question related to these
is then the design of incentive-compatible, fair,
and efficient mechanisms for the house alloca-
tion problem.
Due to increased scarcity of resources, alloca-
tion protocols often involves waiting lists and
priority groups. Policy constraints make wait-
list design a dynamic rationing problem rather
than the static assignment problem discussed
above. Dynamic mechanisms present sev-
eral technical and practical challenges; e.g.,
incentive-compatibility may be infeasible in
dynamic settings due to waiting time trade-
offs for applicants. There are consequen-
tial design decisions related to how to man-
age waitlists and different metropolitan areas
have different policies (e.g., setting priority
groups, conditions under which individuals are
removed from the waiting list, set of choices,
and many others). Each of these policies im-
pacts the dynamics of the allocation process,
waiting time, and quality of matches. Recent
work has studied how to design mechanisms
satisfying various desiderata and quantify dif-
ferences in quality of matches across various
mechanisms Arnosti and Shi [2018], Leshno
[2017], Thakral [2016], Waldinger [2017].
Conclusion
As the use of algorithmic and AI techniques
becomes more pervasive, there is a growing
appreciation of the fact that the most impactful
solutions often fall at the interface of various
disciplines. The Mechanism Design for Social
Good research agenda is to foster an envi-
ronment in which insights from algorithms and
mechanism design can, in conjunction with
the social sciences, be used to improve ac-
cess to opportunity, especially for communi-
ties of individuals for whom opportunities have
historically been limited. In this piece, we have
highlighted MD4SG research avenues related
to issues in developing nations, labor markets,
and housing. For each of these, we have dis-
cussed the need to work in close partnership
with a wide range of stakeholders to set objec-
tives that best address the needs of individ-
uals and propose feasible solutions with de-
sired societal outcomes. There are numerous
other domains in which this kind of interdisci-
plinary approach for designing algorithms and
mechanisms can improve the lives of many
individuals; we invite readers to learn more
through our colloquium and workshop series.
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